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The aim of this paper is to explore whether a least squares learning 
1s able to lead the dynamics of阻 econormcsystem to perfect fores1gh七
equilibrium, and whether a stabilization policy c叩 stabilizeunstable 
le田 tsqu町田learnmgdynarmcs in a monetary overlapping generations 
model. We show tha七leastsquares learnmg dynamics are unstable 1f 
agents have strong wealth e町ectswhich dommate intertemporal sub-
s出叫ione町ects,and overreactiona'y expect叫10ns.Therefore, a le酪七
squ町田 learning1s a source of endogenous learning which drives ecか
nomic fluctuations, and moreover，凶spercepも10nsdoesn't vanish m 
the least squares learnmg dynamics. Then we illustrate that a sta-
bilization policy (the in ere田eof the grow七hra担 ofmoney supply 
through lump sum transfers) can s回bili田叩yunstable learning dy-
nam1cs whenむheleast squares learnmg canno七leadto the perfect 
foresight equilibrium. 
Key words : adaptive (over re配 t1。n町y)expec臼tions’le田
sq凹 .reslearning’stabilization policy，，阻dchaos. 
・Thisisもherevised version of the paper read at the 7th World Congress of Econometric 
Society held in Tokyo, Augus七1995.I a皿 gratefulto Richard H. Day, John Duffy and 
Albe同Marcetfor their田efuladvice and helpful comments. However the remaining errors 
are exclusively mine 
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1 Introduction 
Self-fulfilling expectations町eoften viewed田 along run concept, where 
agents have already learned completely the law of motion governing the sys-
tern in which they operate One should expect the agents to make significant 
forecasting mistakes for qmte some time while they attemp七七olearn七he
dynamic laws of the signals they receive. It is thus quite natural that七he
first question we shall address is how expect叫10nsand learning take place, 
and more importan七ly,whether expectations and learmng will lead towards 
perfect foresight eqmhbrium If the temporary equilibrium dynamics with 
learning (leαm句 d世間四回） don’t ∞町erge切 perfectforesight equilibr叩n
in the long run, then the carrespondmg efficiency losses will appear. The next 
question we m田tconsider is wheもherstabilizat10n policies implemented by 
出egovern皿en七七Oget rid of efficient lasses, can lead ta s七abihzingthe unsta回
ble learning dynamics. Although a considerable number of studies have been 
made on七hesequestions over the p出tfew years, there is httle agreement on 
how the economic sys七emis influenced by expectations and learningi . 
The田mof this paper is to propose an answer to七hetwo questions pased 
above. The basic model we shall use here isthe simple 'Samuelsonian’model 
of overlapping generations2 . We apply dα；ptive (ove作目ction a句j四：pee
tαtio田 asan al七ernativeexpectations form to perfect foresight and we as-
sume th叫 agentsesti回目ethe unknown structural parame七er,(error correc-
tion coe日cient)by using a least squares leαm叩g First, we demonstrate 
出品（i)if agents have strong 凶 ertemporalsubstitution e古田恒 wh凶 dam
mate wealth e百ects,and/or we比lyadaptive目玉pectations，加mpor町yequi-
librium dynamics converge土operfect foresight eqmlibrium, and (n) if agerr回
1 On the町田ntworks of e：叩ectations叩 dlearning mechanisrr叫 seD町田dLm (192), 
Grandmont and Laroque (1回6,1992), Gu•田neneand Woodford (1992), Marcet and Sar-
gent (1989), Ben踊 y阻 dBlad (1989), Evans叩 dHonkapohJa (1994), Bullard (1994) and 
Kaizoji (1995). 
2 Benhabib and Day (1982), and G 
t n。uscycles occur as interte田pmaiequilibrium phenomena Their s七udiesdemon,trate tha 
persistenむecono皿ic日uctuationsgenerated by volatile forecasts are indeed compatible with 
md1v1dual optimization, self-fulfiling expectations阻 dWi油田ianmarket clearing provided 
出atthere are c叩italmarket i皿perfectio田.The outcome of these studies isthat under 
increasingly plausible assumptions, endogeno田 fluc凶ationsequilibria with self-ful臼ling
expectations do occur in such models, se Boldrin and Woodfords' review [Boldrin and 
Woodford (190)]. 
Expeo"tion>，同mingdynomi" ond血e"abil回lionpolioy in an °'"laping gonorntin> mndd 3 
have strong wealth effects which dominate intertemporal substi七utione旺ec回，
and/or strongly overreacも10naryexpectations, temporary eqmlibrium dynam 
i田町eableもobe chaotic Then we illustrate tha七（ii)a least square learnin 
for expectations leads to the perfect foresight equilibrium, provided that七he
endogenous fluctuations are caused by agen胎’overreactionaryexpecta七10ns,
and (1v) on七hecontrary七heleast squ町田learnmgcannot lead加七heperfect 
foresight equilibrium, provided that the endogenous fluctuat10ns are cansed 
by strong wealもheffec臼.Finally, we show七haも（v)a stabilization policy (an 
in ere蹴 of出egrowth rate of money supply) can stabilize unstable learnmg 
dynamics when the least squared learning cannot lead the economic system 
to the perfect for田ighteqmlibrium. 
2 The model 
Consider an overlapping generations model where each generation lives two 
periods The model mvolves one non-s七orablegood and a single asset, money, 
that is employed for七ransferringwealth仕omone period to the nex七 For
most of this paper, the money stock, M will be田sumed七obe consta叫 over
time Agents hve two periods and町e協同四1( eqmvalerr七ly七hereis a single 
agent) m each generation. The agen恒’ endowmentsof the good a七e配hage 
T = 1,2, are e1田ide2 The representative consumer is assumed to have the 
separable utility function, 
U(ci, c2) = logc1 ＋占的／（1β），
）??（?
where c1 and c2 denote consumpt10n in the first and second periods of life 
respectively. As concerns the attitude to risk, this utility funct10n 1s known 
描＇ constant由同市kave凶on’（印刷， wherethe RRA coefficient is 
-v~ （匂）Jv；（匂）＝ β. A large β，which is greater七hanunity, means七hatan 
agent have a strong wealth effect which dominates阻 intertemporalsubsti・目
印 刷neffect, and on吐1econtrary a smallβ，which 1s less than unity, means 
that an agent have a weak wealth effect3 . 
We focus on the Sαmuelson case. Namely, we consider that the consumers 
hold positive money balances, （他国 is,technically this四nbe ensured by 
3 See the chapter 5 of Blanchard叩 dFischer (1985) for a ful accoun色ofthe relation 
beもweena wealth efect andβ 
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choosing the endowments appropri叫ely.)Under the foregomg environment 
we can g国 thewell-defined d首位enceequation that represen七sthe Jaw of 
motion of the economw syste皿
μ, = e1μi+1/liti+1 + (μi+1 + e，）βJ＝χ（μi+il・ (2) 
where 向叩dμ[+1 denote the real balance and the real balance expected by 
the young agent, respectively. The s七eadyst品田 of(2）町・e0 and μ' where 
e, ＝〆＋（μ・＋匂）β.It is proved e田町that(2) h酪 theunique st国ionary
monet町yequilibrium，〆．
2.1 Expectations 
We have a dynamic system where the expectat10ns determine the cur-
rent variablesもhroughequation (2). In order to define七hedynamics釦ly,
we need to speciそythe expectations formation funct10n If agerr臼 doknow 
at the beginning of the period t only the p田tvalues of the real balances, 
（的，向一1,.. ), but they don’t know the current value of the real balance, 
then young agents have to forecast the future values of the real balance by 
using the p田tvalues of real balances at the beginning of七heperiod t. 
One way to expectat10ns form国10n1s to postul叫ethat at each period, 
the real balance µ[•÷1 expected by young agents is a fixed function of the p田七
values of the real balance. In this paper, we国 sume七ha七吐1eexpectations 
町eformed田 follows4
μ;., = (1ー α）μ；＋αμ，1> (3) 
where αis a constant of proportionality called吐1eerror correction coeι 
白cierrιSubstituting(3) into (2), we get 
μi÷1 = (1ー α）μ；＋αχ（μ；）三Fα（μ；） (4) 
4 Ifthe infinite sum conver耳目，thenThe expectations for立国ionfunction (3) is the same 
田七heweighted average of p田もv叫u田
μi+1ニα乞（1α）T-1μ,T• 
T~I 
fapectation" l"mmg dy"'m"' ond tho "ab>li出 m>policy m m。vodnppmggoncrahon• modol 5 
Let us n田nethe case of Oくαく 1the adap七1vecase, and the c田eofl :s;α 
the overreactionary C出e.
The difference equ叫ion( 4)defines a forwαd tempora句句叫＇lib円umdy-
namics叫仇 αdαptive(ove付印ct叩nary)expectαtions. 
The map Fα（〆） has two steady stat田，theperfec七foresightequilibrium 
μ寧 andthe ncトtradeequilibrmm, 0. A steady state of the map x(μ') is equal 
to a steady st叫eof the map Fα（μ＇）. The proof of this statement can be 
given immediately. The perfect foresight eqmlibrium satisfies the equation 
μ事 x（μつ＝0. Then the temporary equilibrium dynamics (4) also become 
the steady state μi+i = μi Thus the above statement is proved. That means 
tha七ast叫ionarytempora句 eq叫ilib巾問叫thadaptive (or overreactionαry} 
expectαtio田 isequal to a perfect for，田ightequilibrium. We will investigate 
the properti田 ofthe forward temporary eqwlibnum dynamics ( 4)in Section 
3 below. 
3 Temporary equilibrium dynamics with adap-
tive expectations 
In the present section we study the dynamic propensities of temporary equi 
librium dynamics which are generated by the equat10n (4). 
3.1 Stability of the perfect foresight equilibrium 
We begin the analysis by demonstrating七hecondi七ionof the local stability 
of the perfect foresight equilibrium μへ
Proposition 1 : If x’（μつ＝（μ’／向）［1＋β（e1 〆）／（μ本＋匂）Jく 2／α，
where 〆isthe unique perfect foresight equilibrium, then the perfect foresigh七
equilibrium μ傘 islocally stable 
Proof of Proposition 1 : It follows that under the above cond1t10n 
the derivative of F（μ＇） 国 theperfect foresight equil伽 ium〆isless than 1. 
Namely, F~ = 1 ＋α［x'（μ＇）ー 1］くー lThe pe巾ctforesight equilib山田〆
is thus locally stable. (Q.E.D.) 
Proposition 1 demonstratesもhat1f the error correction coeflicien七臼and/or
RRA coe伍c1entβaresmall enough, then the temporary eqmlibrmm dynam 
l田 convergeto the stat10nary monetary equilibriU!ll. In other words, 1f田1
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agent h回 avery weakly adaptive expect叫10nand/or a weak wealth effect, 
the perfect foresight equilibrium h回目ability.
3.2 Chaotic dynamics 
In this section we will look at how七hed戸iam1cpropensities of the tern-
por町 equilibriumdynamics _{4) change田 β阻 dαbecomel町ge.We will 
demonst阻むea sufficient cond1t10n for the temporary eqmhbrium dynamics 
to lead to chαos below. 
We begin 印刷dythe e町ectsof the changes of RRA coefficient (3. For 
simplicity of analysis we田sumeα＝1. In this C出ethe expect剖ionformation 
function become μi+i = μ, 1. Under this cond1t10n Grandmont {1985) ancf 
Kelsey {1988) prove the following proposition• ; 
Proposition 2 : For al sufficiently large β，the map F0(μ') h田 a
3-cycle provided e2く 1and e1 ＋匂＞ 1／匂
Proof of Proposition 2 : See the proposition of Grandmont {1985) 
田山heproposition 3.3 of Kelsey {1988). 
Li and Yorke {1975) pr肝 ethat the existence of 3 eye!田皿pli田 chaos.
Therefore the temporary equilibrium dynamics ( 4)become chaotic for any 
SU血cientlylarge β 
Figure 1 isthe bifurcation diagram of μ; whe四七heRRA coefficientβ 
varies smoothly仕om5 to 30 under the spec1ficat10nα ＝ 1，町＝ 10 and 
匂＝ 0.95. From Figure 1 we can know tha七〆 begms七obe unstable where 
the value ofβis equal to 5. 754. (We can calcul叫ethe value of βby using 
the condition of Proposition 1 ) Figure 1 also shows chaos to occur七hrough
a sequence of penod doublings which is one route to chaos. Thus, Figure 1 
illustrates the results of Propasi七10n2 
Then we study the effects of the changes of the error correction coefficient 
α初出etemporary equilibrmm dynamics 
Proposition 3 : Assume that α＞ 2／χ’（〆） Then there ex目白白
such th叫 thetemporary equilibrium dynamics {4）町echaotic in the sense 
of Li-Yorke 
5 Ben！帥1band Day {1982) demonstrates the su日C剛もconditio田 forLi Yorke chaos in 
Gale economy. 
Exp"""o"', l"mmg dyo,mi" nod tho •tobilimtmo pohoy m血 o"doppioggoornto"' modol 7 
Proof of Proposition 36 : The map x and F satisfy the following ; 
x(O) = o,x（μつ＝μヘ
F0 > μ' for 0 < μ' < μ' 
Fα ＜ μ' for μ本く μ＇< +oo・
Figure 2 (a) and Figure 2 (b) show the map x and the corresponding map 
FαF denotes the value of〆whichmaximizes the map F0, and μ;denotes 
もhevalue of μ' where Fα（μ；） = 0. The map F0 in Figure 2 (b) is more hump 
出血themap x(μ') in Figure 2 (a). It means th叫 αisgreater than 1. Under 
the above conditions the maximum of F0 mere出回国αbecomeslarge, and 
the m回 mumof F0 approaches to +oo，田αapproachto +oo. On the o七her
hand the value of μ;, decreases田 αbecomesI町ge，加dμ; approaches to〆，
拙 αapproachesto +oo. From the continuity of the map Fαwith respect to 
α七here申ds白 αsuchthat the maximum of Fα（μ＇） is equal七oμ;. Therefore 
it follows th叫 thereexi剖 αsuchthat Fαsatisfies the so-called overshoot 
condition 
F，；（戸）く F~ （P.') :<; P.' ＜凡（p.'). (5) 
(Q.E.D.) 
Figure 3 isthe bifurcation diagram ofμ[ where the error correction coef.目
ficien七白 variessmoo七hlyfrom 0 9 to1 3 under the specificationβ ＝ 5.754, 
e1 = 10叩 de, = 0.95. Figure 3 shows chaos to occur七hrougha sequence 
of period doublings出 αbecomeslarge. Fmally Figure 4 summanzes七he
propens1ti田 ofthe ter明 raryequilibrium dynamics w地 adaptive( overre 
ac七ionary)expectations. These figures demonstrate that cyclic and chaotic 
adaptive learning dynamics町e国 usedby any largeβand/or any large白 e
In other words, if agents have strong、.vealth e百ects,complex endogenous 
fluctuations occurs, and the complexity of the learning dynamics is amplified 
by overreact10nary exp田t叫ions
4 Least squ紅白 learningdynamics 
In the foregoing section we田sumethat the e宜pectationformat10n functicn 
1s the fixed function (3) over the time of p田tvalues of μ,. Howe四 r,1 seems 
6 Foe出eprnof of Propos比一on3, se also Katzoji (1995). 
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natural to suppose tha七at七hebeginning of七heperiod t, agerr旬 getsome 
estimate αt of the error correction coefficie凶 αbyapplying a given statis-
七icalprocedure to p田tobserva七ions，α＇= h(μ,_,, μ, 2，・・ー） Let us now 
at七emptto extend this consideration mto the adaptive learning dynamics. 
It seems七hata least squ町田 learmngrule is one of most n抗uralstatistical 
methods that agents get some estimate of αWe田町田e七hefollowing leas七
squared learning rule of α， 
where 
T-2 
min I:l向一T µ~－Tl2 
T~l 
μ: T = (1ー α）μ：－T l ＋αχ（μιT-1l・ 
(6) 
(7) 
Substituting (8) in回（7)and solving the above minimization problem, we 
ge七
L:~ゴ（的ーT ー µ：－T ,)(μt-T-2 -μ: T il (8) ε~＝~（向一T-2 一 µi-T 1)2 
Therefi凹ethe leas七squ町田learningdynamics are : 
μ:+1 = (1一向）μ；＋αix(μ:J. (9) 
It is di伍cultto analyze the le田七squ町田learningdynamics (9) mathem叫l
cally because (9) is a multi-dimensional di町erenceequ叫wnThus we show 
the dynamic properti田 of(9) through computer simulat10ns Figure 5 sum田
m町田sthe propensities of the least squ町田learningdynamics (9) In Figure 
5αof七hehorizontal axis is that七heini七ialvalues of αbefore agen七sbegin 
le田七squareslearmng. 
Comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5, we find七hatin the area D in Figure 5 
le田tsquares learnmg dynamics converge to the perfect foresight equihbnum 
戸 whiletemporary equilibrium dynamics (4) are unstable. To look at this 
more concre同ly,we拙 sumeα0= 1.3，β＝ 5，町＝ 10，阻de2 = 0.95 where 
αo deno七esthe initial value of the error correction coefficiea七.Figure 6 shoVJS 
both time paths ofもhetemporary equilibrium dynamics ( 4)and the least 
squ町田 learningdynamics (9) under this set of p町amete四 Timeseri田 of
temporary equilibrium dynamics are chaotic (the area A in Figure 6) The 
point，αis the starting point of the least squares learning. After the agents 
E<pectotion<, leommg dy"'m"' '"d曲e, ..h且uonpohoy m叩 O'O,iopinggoneration< model 9 
do the learning of臼 accordingto (8), the value of αchanges仕om13加
about 0.88, and soもhele出も叩ar田 lea目lingdynamics {9)_ conve耶 quic』仁
towards色heperfect fores1gh七equihbrmmμ噂（七he町eaB m Figure 6). We 
also find that, in al values of （αo，β）七hatwe put computer simulations m 
practice，αt 1s staymg m the area of Oく αtく 1after agen旬 beginthe 
least squares learmng Thus the least squares learmng is effective against 
the stabilization of七hechaotic dynamics which is caused by overrac七10nary
expect叫ions（α0 > 1). 
On the other hand Figure 7 shows bo七htime paths of the temporary 
equilibnum dynamics and the least squ町田learningdynamics under a large 
βWe田S田町α0= 1，β＝ 18.5, e1 = 10, and匂＝ 0.95. Under this set of 
parameters, time series of tempor町叩山brmmdynamics are chaotic (the 
町eaA in Figure 7). The point，αis the starting point of the least squ町田
learning After the agen担 dothe learning of αaccording to (8), the value 
of αchanges仕om1 to about 0.77. Never吐lelessthe least squ町田 learning
dynamics {9) occur bounded irregular fluctuations (the area B m Figure 7). 
The re田onis th叫 astrong wealth e旺ect，もha七is,a large β，give cause for 
endogenous fluctua七10nsIn this c田eagents’m1spercept10ns never vanish in 
山 le副 learningdynamics (9) even in出 long-runterm 
5 Stabilization policy 
It follows from the foregoing阻 alys田七ha七theunstable least squares learnmg 
dynamics町ecaused by the weal七heffect which dominates田 mtertemporal
substitution efect. Since the instability of learnmg dynamics me叩 stha七
young agents have forecasting mistakes ofもhereal balances at the next period, 
it will reduce economic efficiency. 
Therefore, it 1s an important question m this C出ewhether any economic 
policy which the government implements can stabilize the unstable learning 
dynamics 
According to Gr叩 dmont(1986), let us田sumein addition that there is 
a government. At period t, it gtv•田 a lump sum money subsidy S, (to be 
interpreted曲 alump sum tax if negative) to七heold agent. We define七he
growth rates ofもhemoney supply拙 follows,
St= (M,_, + S,)/M,_1, (10) 
IO 
where M, 1 > 0 designates the money stock a七theoutset of period t. Given 
Mo >0，七heevolution of the money supply is then ruled by 
M, = M, 1St > 0, given Mo > 0, 
）?????（
A newborn consumer h田 tosolve七hefollowing decision problem. Let 
p > 0 be the current money price of the good, and /:,.m' lump s国nsubsidy 
that he expects at the present period for the ne同 period.He must choose 
then his current and future consumptwn c1さ0,c2 :; 0, and his money 
demand m三0so田 toma羽田izehis utility function subject to 
pci + m = pei and p'c-, = p'e2 + /:,.m' (12) 
We田sumethat the government informs correctly the young consumer of the 
quant抗1田， ／：，.m前七henext ~eriod. Then the least squ町田learningdynamics 
町egiven by七hefollowing difference equations ; 
ん n • .< 
µ~+1 = (1一向）μ；ー ァ一一三竿竺土 (13) 
In this c田ethe perfect foresight equilibrium is 〆wherethe equality, 
ei = μ' + s,(μ' + e2）βholds. It follows世omthis equality that the change 
the growth r叫eof money supply s, (monetary policy) influences the seもof
statwnary state magnitudes, so that it influences the least squares learning 
dynamics 
Figure 8 illustrates this stabilizing effect of七hemonetary policy To 
analyze七hee旺ectof the monetary pohcy, we assume that s, is a p町田neter
s, and choose β＝ 18.5, ei = 10, e2 = 0.95, s = 1 and α0 = 1田 the
initial value As we illustrate above, both of the tempor町yequihbnum 
dynami田（4) and the leas七squar田 learm時 dynamics(9) are unstable under 
もhisset of p町悶eters The time seri田 ofμ1 of the area A m Figure 8 are 
七hetemporary e吐uilibriumdynamics, and the time series of μ; of the町ea
B a同七hele出七 squ紅白learningdynamics before吐ieimplementatwn of the 
monetary policy under β＝ 18.5, ei = 10, and e2 = 0.95. Both七imeseries 
of μ1 fluctuate irregularly. Then, we consider th叫 thegovernment increases 
the rate of growth of money supply丘oms = 1 to s > 1.In Figure 8 the 
point b is七hestarting point of implemen七ationof the monetary policy The 
perfect foresight equilibriu皿〆 decreasesand the graph of the map x is
pushed down by the monet町Ypolicy. Hence if七hegrowth ra白 ofmoney 
E>pe'"'"'・ !OMnmg dynom＂＇皿d由e'"b•fo<ation pohoy m an o"dapPmg ge'Orn>iOm modol 1 
supply s islarge enough, then the learning dynamics may con四 rgeto七he
perfect for田ightequilibrium. The time series of μ; of the町eaC in Figure 
8町ethe lea品 squaresle町田ngdynamics after七heimplementation of七he
monetary policy under β＝ 18.5, e1 = 10，匂＝ 0.95，阻ds = 3 5.After the 
implementation of the monetary policy, the learning dynarmcs converge to 
むhenew perfect foresight equilibrmm. Figure 9 summarizes七hestab11izmg 
effects of the monetary policy Figure 9 illustrates that any unstable least 
squares learnmg dynamics can be s回b1lizedby the monetary policy. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, (1) 1f agents have strong wealth effects which dommate in-
tertemporal substitution e偽cts,then the least squares learning dynamics 
町eun前able,and (i) a stabilization policy (an increase of the rate of grow出
of money supply through lump sum transfers) c叩 stab山zeany unstable 
learning dynamics when the learning cannot lead to the perfect fores1ghも
equilibrium 
Our findings suggest tha七aleast squares learnmg is able to be an mde 
pendent source of endogenous learnmg which drives economic fluctu叫10ns,
and moreover that sigmficant forecasting mISt品目smay not vamsh in the 
least squares learnmg dynamics. These misperceptions may reduce economic 
efficiency. Then it is impor七回tto stabilize the learning dynamics by govern 
ment's intervention. 
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"' に0 ト、 α3 σ3 ~ ~ N グヲ てr． "' 0 。。。。 戸
α 
Figure 4 
Figure 4 summ町izesthe propensities of七hetemporary e司uilibriu皿 dy-
nami田 withadaptive (overreactionary) expect叫 !OTIS(4) 
A ・ The temporary equilibrium dynamics (4) converge七othe perfect 
foresight equilibrium μ’ 
B . There are cycles of penod 2へandchaotic fluctuat10ns. 
C The tempor町yeqmlibrmm dynamics diverge. 
Figure 4 demon前回.testh叫 thetemporary叩帥riwndynanucs (4) con-
vergeも0七heperfect foresight equilibrium when βand/or α町esmall while 
cychc and chaotic temporary eqmlibrium dynamics are caused by any large 
βand/or any large α 
Expec1'UO回，l""ingdynonn" ond血o'tabdirntion policy in四 ovodopi昭＂＇＂＇＂。田 model17 
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Figure 5 α。
Figure 5 summ町田田 thepropensities of the lea.st squares learning dy-
namics (8). 
A . The least squares learning dynamics converge to the perfect foresight 
e吐mlibnumμ・
B : The least squares learning dynamics occur bounded irregul町 fluctu-
atio田．
C : The least squar田 learmngd戸iam1csdiverge 
D The least squares learning dynamics converge to the perfect foresight 
equilibrium µ• 
In Figure 5α0 of the horizontal axis is that the initial values of a before agents 
begm le田七squareslearnmg. Comparmg Figure 4 and Figure 5, we find that 
in the area D m Figure 5 the least squares learning dynamics converge to 














Fi gt」「巴 6:T巴mporaryequilibrium dynamics and Least 







Figure 6 shows both七imepaths of七hetemporary equilibrium dynamics 
and the le踊七 squareslearnmg dynamics under a large α0 and a large f3 
we assumeα。＝ 13，β＝ 5,e1 = 10, and e2 = 0 95. Under this set of 
parameters, time se悶 oftemporary equilibrium dynamics are chaotic (the 
area A in Figure 6). The point，αis the starting point of the least squar四
learning. After the agerr旬dothe learning of αaccording to (7), the value of 
αchanges from 1.3 to about 0.8, and so the leas七squareslearning dynamics 
(8) converge quickly towards the perfect fores妙tequilibrium〆（thearea B 
in Figure 6). 
Ex"''"'"o"', loommg dyoom＂＇叩d血e.tobili副 ioopolky m '" omloppmg gooc凶 io0<modol 19 

















A B Period 
Figure 7 
Figure 7 shows bo七htime paths of the temporary equilibrium dynamics 
and the least squ町eslearning dynamics undera large α0 and a sufficiently 
large βWe田sumeα。＝ l，β＝18 5, e1 = 10, and e, = 0.95. Under this 
set of parameters, time series of temporary equilibrium dynamics町echaotic 
(the area A in Figure 7). The poir 
learning. After七heagents do the learmng of αaccordmg to (7), the value of 
αchanges世om1加 about0. 77 and the least squ町田learningdynamics (8) 
occur bounded megular fluctuat10ns (the area B m Figure 7) The re田onis 
thaももhestrong wealth effects give cause for endogenous fluctuations 
20 
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Figure 8 illustrates this s七abilizingeffect of the mone七百ypolicy ( 阻
increase of the growth ra同 ofmoney supply). To analyze the effect of the 
monetary policy, We set f32 = 18 5，向＝ 10，匂＝ 0.95, s = 1 and α0 = 1 
The time series of μ1 of七hearea A in Figure 8町ethe tempor町yequilibrium 
dynamics, and七he七imeseries of μ1 of the area B are the lea.s七squareslearnmg 
dynamics before the implement叫10nof the mone七世ypolicy under β＝ 18.5, 
e1=10, and匂＝ 0 95 Both ti皿eseries of μ1 flue七uateirregularly. Then we 
consider that the governmen・七increasesthe rate of grow七hof money supply 
仕oms=ltos>l Thepm叫 bis the star七mgpoint of implemen七at10n
of the monetary policy. The time series of μ; of the町田 C町ethe lea品
squ世田leammgdynamics after七heimplementation of the mone同rypolicy 
underβ＝ 18.5, e1 = 10, e2 = 0.95, and s = 3.5. After the implementation 
of the monetary policy the learmng dynamics convergeもothe new perfect 
foresight equilibrium. 













Figure 9 : The effects of stabilization policy 
U') t.O （！）てf ~σ、 lJ") ト、 σ、
N てr CJ? co ・．．．．, , .NNNNN 
The growth rate of money supply , s 
Figure 9 summarizes the stabilizing effects of七hemonetary pohcy. 
A . The leas七squar田 learnigdynamics (13) converge to the perfect fore-
sight equilibriu皿 μ（
B . The least squares learning dynamics (13) occ町 boundedfluctuations. 
Figure 9 illustrates that any uns七ablele田七squareslearning dyna皿icscan be 
国abilizedby the monetary policy. 
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世代重複モデルにおける期待形成，学習過程および安定化政策
海蔵寺大成
新古典派経済学の多くのモデルにおいて，いわゆる合理的期待形成が仮
定されている。すなわち，経済主体はあらかじめ経済の将来の姿を適切に
予想し行動すると考えられている。しかし，現実の世界では経済の行方を
的確に予想することは大変困難であり，我々は現実に対する認識をしばし
ば誤ってしまう。
この論文の目的は，
(1）合理的期待形成を仮定する代わりに，経済主体の予想形成と学習過
程を具体的に定式化し，経済主体の予想形成のメカニズムが経済システム
を不安定化する可能性があること，
( 2 ）不安定化した経済システムを経済政策によって安定化することが可
能であること
を示すことである。
我々は経済主体の予想形成仮説として，適応的予想形成を，学習システ
ムとして最小二乗学習を採用する。最初に，これらの予想形成と学習に
よって，経済システムの不安定性が増大L，カオスが発生することが示さ
れる。次に，金融政策によって，経済システムのカオスが安定化され，経
済システムが均衡状態に誘導されることが示される。
